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Abstract: Using a simple model of income redistribution, we examine the effect of income 
inequality on redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. Our results suggest that in the 
presence of tax evasion, a political equilibrium may be characterized by inefficiently high tax 
rate, i.e. higher than the revenue maximizing tax rates. Moreover in contrast to the 
conventional wisdom higher income inequality may be associated with lower redistribution. 
This is because in countries with weak institutional framework political parties may increase 
the probability of winning the elections by choosing policies that expand the number of tax 
evading individuals.  
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En général, l’art du gouvernement consiste à prendre le plus d’argent qu’on peut à une grande 
partie des citoyens, pour le donner à une autre partie.  
In general, the art of government consists in taking as much money as possible from one party of 
the citizens to give to the other. 
Voltaire.  
1. Introduction 
For long economists and political scientists alike, have been trying to answer what 
determines the extent and the nature of government redistributive programs. 
Following the seminal contributions of Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer 
and Richard (1981), income redistribution is portrayed as the voting outcome in 
elections with office motivated parties who seek the support of the median voter. In 
all these models, as long as the income of the median voter is below the average 
income, the median voter will support policies that impose a positive tax rate on 
income accompanied with positive per capita transfers. Moreover there will be more 
redistribution the lower median income is relative to mean income (the higher is the 
inequality). 
However, income transfers are not the only instrument for income redistribution. 
In poor institutional environments the government may opt for other, inefficient forms 
of redistribution. For example Alesina et al. (2000; 2001) argue that politicians may 
use public employment as a disguised redistributive policy. Skouras and 
Christodoulakis (2011) present detailed empirical evidence that electoral cycles are 
associated with increased corruption and tax evasion. Similar electoral cycles are also 
documented in the enforcement of labour regulation (Ronconi, 2009). 
In the present paper we explore theoretically the idea that the government uses tax 
evasion in order to redistribute income. We build a rather standard model of 
redistribution in the presence of tax evasion (see e.g. Roine 2006; Borck, 2009; 
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Traxler, 2009) where all individuals are assumed to receive a per capita transfer by 
the government, whereas only a share of the population pays taxes and the other are 
able to evade them by incurring a fixed cost. This assumption guarantees that (i) 
richer individuals are evading, whereas poor people pay taxes and most importantly 
(ii) tax evaders are the net recipients of government redistribution. In this setting, 
preferences are not necessarily single- peaked nor satisfy the single crossing property 
(Borck, 2009; Traxler, 2009). Therefore, the “identity” of the decisive voter may be 
unknown (and changing) and median voter theorem may not hold. In order to address 
this issue we assume that voting over the tax rate is probabilistic and this allows us to 
derive the political equilibrium level of taxation.   
Under these assumptions (i.e., tax evasion by the rich and probabilistic voting) our 
model produces a number of interesting results. First, our model predicts that the 
equilibrium tax rate may be above the revenue maximizing tax rate. The economy 
therefore operates on the negatively slopped part of a Laffer (type) curve.1 This is 
because, in our model, an increase in the tax rate, apart from raising revenues to 
finance spending, also increases the number of tax evaders. Hence the office 
motivated parties propose a higher tax- than the one maximizing revenues- in order to 
increase the welfare of those individuals that marginally choose to evade taxes when 
facing a higher tax rate. Then the government uses tax evasion as a means of 
redistributing income to tax evading individuals which in turns increases the 
probability of winning the elections.     
                                                 
1 In principle, the theoretical justification for a Laffer curve, rests on the changes in factor supplies due 
to changes on the tax rate. Laffer’s (1986) original argument suggested that when tax rates become 
higher agents withdraw from the labor market. Alternatively agents may withdraw from the labor force 
and enter the black market (Heijman and van Ophem, 2005) or disclose their income from the tax 
authorities (Sanyal et al., 2000). In both cases a non- monotonic relationship between tax rates and 
revenues is expected, thus we refer to it as a Laffer curve effect. 
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Second, we show that there can be a non linear relationship between inequality 
and redistribution. In this respect the two papers more closely related to ours are 
Rodriguez (2004) and De Freitas (2012). In the former a higher inequality is 
associated with higher rent seeking activities for tax exemptions, which ultimately 
leads voters to demand lower tax rates so as to mitigate the rent seeking activities. On 
the other hand, in De Freitas (2012) an increase in inequality is associated with an 
increase in informal sector activities, which erodes the tax base and may lead to lower 
redistribution.  In our model, the driving force behind this non- linear effect is 
government's ability to raise voter's welfare by increasing tax evasion. When 
inequality increases, less individuals are at the end of the income distribution, which 
ceteris paribus implies a decline in the share of evaders. Therefore the ability of the 
government to use tax evasion as a means of redistribution is deteriorated. In this case 
it is optimal for the government to reduce the tax rate. If the economy operates on the 
positively (resp. negatively) sloped side of the Laffer curve this leads to lower (resp. 
higher) spending. For some parameter values of inequality this effect dominates the 
standard redistribution effect (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), which ultimately generates 
the non-linear relationship in our model.     
Our findings are consistent with a number of recent papers (Roine, 2006; Borck, 
2009; Traxler, 2009; Traxler, 2012) which show that in the presence of tax evasion, 
the tax system may be less redistributive than if everyone reported truthfully. 
Moreover if the tax evasion technology is such that the rich evade more than the poor, 
these models predict redistribution from the middle class towards both the poor and 
the rich. In addition our results are in accordance with a number of empirical papers 
that either fail to provide a robust relationship or find a negative association between 
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income inequality and redistribution (Perotti, 1996; Rodriguez, 1999; Bassett et al., 
1999; Moene and Wallerstein, 2003).  
   Finally according to our results, the equilibrium tax rate is more likely to be 
greater than the revenue maximizing one, in economies characterized by greater 
equality. This is because at high levels of equality, political parties may gain more 
votes by redistributing income through tax evasion. This latter result is consistent with 
the fact that countries with low income inequality are more likely to end up in the 
negatively sloped side of the Laffer curve (see from example Trabandt and Uhlig, 
2011; 2012).2      
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model 
and shows how individuals choose whether to evade or not, as well as the effects of 
tax evasion on the level of revenues. In Section 3, we explain how the political 
equilibrium is determined and derive the equilibrium conditions. In Section 4, the 
comparative statics of the endogenous variables with respect to changes in inequality 
are presented. As the results are in general ambiguous, we present the results of our 
numerical analysis. Finally Section 5 concludes.      
 
2. The model 
Consider an economy populated by a fixed number of risk neutral individuals, N.3 
Individuals differ in their income endowment, with ei standing for household’s i 
income. We assume that there is a continuum of individuals, [ ]0,1i∈ , and that their 
                                                 
2For example Tradanbt and Uhlig (2011) find that from the sample of OECD countires only Denmark 
and Sweden- both having very low pre-tax and transfers gini coefficients- are on the negatively slopped 
side of the Laffer curve. 
3 A more elaborate model would include risk averse individuals and endogenous labor supply. These 
features however add further non- linearities in the first order conditions, making the comparative 
statics intractable and causing the model to break down for a wide range of parameter values. Thus for 
the sake of clarity and keeping in line with the models of Roine (2006) and Borck (2009) we assume 
risk neutrality and exogenous income. 
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income endowment is  distributed according to a Pareto Probability Distribution 
Function (PDF). 
 1( ) , with α>1
a
a
bf e a
e +
=   
       
Parameter b stands for the lowest income in the population, and parameter a 
determines the shape of the distribution- with higher values of a implying greater 
equality. The Pareto distribution, in addition to being easy to work with, is a relatively 
good approximation of actual income distributions. Empirical estimates of the value 
of a range between 1.5 and 3.0 (see, Creedy (1977)).4  The mean of the Pareto 
distribution is equal to  
 1
ab
a
μ = −   
 
 
The government levies a proportional tax on income, at a tax rate t, in order to 
finance per capita income transfers g. Therefore, the government redistributes income 
by taxing proportionally individual income and paying a fixed amount g to each i, 
irrespective of their income (reported or true). As we allow individuals to evade taxes, 
the net beneficiaries of government spending are those that their tax payment based 
on their reported income is below the per capita transfers. As long as the distribution 
of reported incomes is different from the distribution of true incomes, redistribution 
does not necessarily take place from the rich to poor.  
Following Roine (2006) we assume that individuals may conceal a part ψ of their 
income from the tax authorities. This is achieved by incurring a fixed cost equal to θ. 
However, there is a fixed probability π that evaders will be audited and their income 
will be revealed. In this case this they pay a fine proportional to the total amount 
                                                 
4 These values correspond to a Gini coefficient in the range between 0.2 and 0.5. 
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evaded, given by feit, where f>1. With risk- neutral individuals, this is equivalent to 
assuming that by paying a fixed cost θ, i can evade the payment of a share ψ(1-π)f of 
his tax payment. Hence, even though we model risky tax evasion, the assumption of 
risk- neutrality results to equivalent results to a model of legal tax avoidance.    
 
 2.1 Individual decisions 
Individuals in this economy face two decisions. A binary choice of whether they will 
evade or not and a political decision of how to vote for the tax rate and the consequent 
level of redistribution. The above imply that the utility of a tax evading individual i 
can be written as: 
 (1 )
E
i i i iU e e t f e t gψ θ π ψ= − − − − +  (1)
  
 
whereas the utility of an individual which truthfully declares its income is  
 (1 )NEi iU e t g= − +  (2)
  
 
Then individual i will choose to evade taxes, if the utility derived under tax 
evasion is greater than the utility by honestly declaring its income, i.e. if  is greater 
than , i.e.  
 (1 )i
e
f t
θ
ψ π> −   
 
Letting if ε denote the level of income for which it holds that 
  (1 )f t
θε ψ π= −  (3)
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it follows that only individuals with ei>ε will choose to tax evade ψ part of their 
income, and individuals with ei<ε will declare their full income and pay full taxes. In 
other words in the present model, the tax evading individuals are those top of the 
income distribution.5   
  Equation  reveals that ceteris- paribus, lower cost of tax evasion- i.e. lower θ-, or 
higher share of taxes evaded- i.e. higher ψ(1-π)f- results into a lower threshold income 
for tax evasions ε and consequently to more tax evasion. Moreover a higher tax rate t 
–which is endogenously determined in the political equilibrium- also results into a 
higher share of tax evaders in total population.  
  
2.2 Government 
The government receives income tax revenues and fines from those caught tax 
evading. We assume that it uses all these revenues in order to finance per capita 
transfers, g.  
Then using the PDF of the Pareto distribution, the total tax receipts of the 
government are equal to:  
 1(1 )
a
a
bt N t f N e a de
eε
μ ψ π ∞ +⎛ ⎞Τ = − − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  (4)
  
 
Equation (4)  states that total collected taxes are equal to total revenues in the absence 
of tax evasion (i.e. tμN) minus the net (i.e. excluding fines) total amount evaded. 
                                                 
5 This is consistent with the empirical evidence; studies on the effect on tax evasion on income 
inequality show that the share of tax evasion is positively correlated with income (see for example 
Pashardes and Polycarpou, 2008; Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2010). Moreover the results of the 1999 
World Values Survey show that the share of respondents disagreeing with the statement “cheating on 
taxes if you have the chance is never justified” is greater for individuals at high than low income levels. 
For example, in Greece 69.9% of high income respondents disagreed with the statement (compared to 
the 57.4% for the low income respondents), whereas for Italy the corresponding figures were 48.2% 
and 40.2% and for the Japan 19.5% and 14% respectively. 
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According to (4) higher θ, π and f, i.e. higher cost of tax evasion, higher probability of 
detection and higher penalty are associated with higher revenue. 
 The above equation, presents a Laffer- type relationship between the tax rate and 
total government revenues. Typically the Laffer curve represents a non- linear effect 
between the tax rate and total revenues due to changes in factor supplies (see for 
example Minford and Ashton, 1991). Here the non- linear effect is derived from the 
incentives for tax evasion: increases on t, changes the level of income for which the 
individual is indifferent between evading and truthfully declaring its income, i.e. ε, 
inducing an increase in tax evading individuals (see also Sanyal et al., 2000). In other 
words a higher tax increases the share of individuals for which tax evasion has a 
positive net benefit. Thus the overall effect of a change in t is ambiguous: on the hand 
a higher t results into higher revenues, by increasing the share of taxes received, 
whereas on the other hand a higher t reduces declared income, reducing overall 
revenues.   
Given the setup of our model, equation  is concave in t. We can therefore derive a 
unique revenue maximizing tax rate, by simply differentiating  with respect to t  
 
1
max 1 1 1(1 )
a a
a a at f a
b
θψ π− − −= −  (5)
   
As all tax revenues are used to finance per capita transfers g, the government 
budget constraint can be written as:  
 ( ) 1(1 ) 1
a
a a a aabg t t f
a
μ ψ π θ −= − − −  (6)
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3. Political equilibrium  
In the above general setting, preferences are not in general single- peaked nor 
satisfy the single crossing property. The rationale for this is as follows: consider an 
individual with income above the average. As long as the tax rate (t) is so low that the 
individual does not evade, his utility is an decreasing function of t. This is because 
individual’s tax payment is larger than the per capita transfers he receives. Thus, he 
votes against higher taxes. However as t rises, there exists a threshold above which 
the individual chooses to evade taxes. For t above that threshold, utility is increasing 
in t, due to the fact that the individual is a net beneficiary of government spending 
(and as long as t<tmax). This is because the individual no longer pay taxes whereas at 
the same time receives positive per capita transfers. In this case, he votes for higher 
taxation. 
When preferences are not single- peaked nor satisfy the single crossing property 
the “identity” of the decisive voter may be unknown (and changing) and median voter 
theorem does not hold.6 To overcome this problem, we assume that taxes are chosen 
though probabilistic voting.7 The political mechanism works as follows: before any 
individual choices are made (i.e. before individuals choose whether to tax evade or 
not), there is voting among the population about the level of t and g. In these 
elections, two political parties compete over winning the elections, by proposing a tax 
rate t. Then the level of g follows directly from equation (6). After the elections the 
winning party (government) implements the proposed policy.  
                                                 
6 In order to obtain political equilibrium, a number of solutions has been provided, for example Roine 
(2006) develops a numerical method which allows him to explore the political equilibria and Borck 
(2009) proceeds by complete characterization of the voting outcomes. 
7 Probabilistic voting has been used extensively when the median voter thereom does not hold. For 
example De La Croix and Doepke (2009) use a probabilistic voting equilibrium when preferences are 
not single peaked nor satisfy the single crossing property, whereas Lin et al. (1999) and Adams (1999) 
assume probabilistic vote in a multi-party model of electoral competition.  
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We assume that each individual votes with a positive, but not necessarily equal to 
1, probability the party’s proposal that gives him the highest utility.8 Under 
probabilistic voting each party seeks to maximize its expected vote share given the 
expected vote share of the other party. The maximization problem of each party 
implements the maximum of the following weighted Benthamite social welfare 
function (Muller, 2003, p. 253- 259):  
 [ ] [ ]1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
a a
i i ia ab
i i
ab abW k e t g de e t f e t g de
e e
ε
ε θ ψ π
∞
+ +⎡ ⎤= − + + − − − − +⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  (7)
  
 
where k is the relative weight of the non- evaders in the utility of the government.9  
Maximizing  subject to the government budget constraint , with respect to t, yields the 
following first order condition 
 
 
[ ]
1
1 1
2
(1 ) (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 )
1 1 (1 )
( 2) (1 ) (1 )
                                                                  0
( 1) (1 )
a a
a a aa b b tt k f k
a a f t
a f k k
a f t
θθ ψ π θ ψ π
θ ψπ ψ ψ
ψ π
−
− −++ − − − + − +− − −
− − − − −+ =− −
(8) 
 
The solution to equation (8) gives the equilibrium tax rate, denoted as t*. Then 
equation (6) can be directly used to determine g.  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The idea behind probabilistic voting is that voters care about non- observable variables to the policy 
choices, like ideology, voter turnout, character of the candidates, influence of campaign advertising etc. 
(see Coughlin, 1992; Hinich and Munger, 1997, p.171- 177). 
9 In the numerical results that follow we assume that k<1. This is necessary for a well defined solution 
that satisfies the second order conditions of the problem. This implies that the government places 
greater weight on the utility of the tax evaders, which however may be in equilibrium the majority of 
the population. 
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4. Results 
4.1 The effect of inequality 
As can be easily verified, equation (8) cannot be solved analytically for t*, 
however it can be used to derive the comparative statics effect of changes in the 
(in)equality parameter a. Total differentiating (8), and solving it, yields, after some 
simplifications:  
 
[ ]
[ ]
1ˆ ˆ2(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 2 log ( 1)ˆ ˆ ˆ
( 1) ˆ ˆ2 2(1 ) ( 2) (1 ) (1 )ˆ ˆ
a
a
b bt k b f k k a
tdt
da a b k a f k k
t
θε ψπ ψ ψ ε ε
θ θ ε ε ψπ ψ ψε
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − + − − − − + − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤− ⎛ ⎞− − − − − − − − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
   (9) 
 
where hats above variables indicate the underlying equilibrium values of t and ε. From 
the second order conditions of the maximization problem, the denominator of (9) is 
negative. However the numerator of (9) can be either positive or negative depending 
on the underlying parameter values. In what follows we try to numerically determine 
the relationship between α and t, and to give the intuition behind our main result.  
Since our interest lies on the effects of a—ceteris paribus—change in inequality, 
and changes in a affect the average ability (and income) in the economy, in the 
following figures we depict the relationship between inequality and the variables of 
interest for a given level of average ability (by changing the underlying value of b). 
Following the empirical estimates of Creedy (1977) we assumed that a takes values 
between 1.5 and 3.0. The rest of the parameter values used in the following figures are 
f=1.2, π=0.05, k=0.85, μ=0.3, ψ=0.75. These values guarantee that the second order 
conditions of the maximization problem are satisfied, all endogenous variables of the 
model satisfy the underlying non- negativity constraints and that the equilibrium share 
  13
of tax evading households takes on realistic values (i.e. undeclared income up to 
around 50%, as in Schneider, 2005).10 
The following figure depicts the relationship between a and the equilibrium tax 
rate t* for θ=0.05 and θ=0.04. Moreover in each diagram we also depict revenue 
maximizing tax rate, denoted maxt  and the per capita transfer g as a share of average 
income μ as these are crucial for understanding the intuition behind the underlying 
relationship between a and t* 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between t and a, for θ=0.05 and θ=0.04 
Our results can be summarized along the following lines. Firstly, the effect of a 
change in a on the per capita transfers (g) is non- linear. However, for a wide range of 
values for α (in the first diagram of Figure 1 for α<2.7 and in the second diagram for 
α<2.5) there is a negative association between income inequality and g. Therefore in 
the presence of tax evasion the standard positive relationship between income 
inequality and redistribution may be reversed.  
The intuition behind the above relationship can be better understood using the 
properties of the probabilistic voting model. The political equilibrium is achieved 
when the marginal welfare of the two groups (evaders and non- evaders) is equalized 
                                                 
10 See figure 2 below. 
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(Mueller, 2003). Consider then an increase in a. Due to the Pareto distribution, for 
given t, higher a implies an increase in the share of the tax evading households (more 
individuals with income above ε) and thus the marginal utility of the evaders becomes 
greater than the marginal utility of the non –evaders. Redistribution through tax 
evasion becomes less costly for the political parties. Therefore in the new equilibrium, 
political parties propose a higher t* as this will increase the marginal welfare of the 
non- evaders and restore the equilibrium. When max*t t< , the new equilibrium is 
reached by also lowering marginal welfare of evaders, whereas when max*t t>  , the 
marginal utility of the evaders is also increasing in t thus in the new equilibrium the 
marginal utility of the evaders is also higher.  
 
4.2 Equilibrium tax rate above the revenue maximizing tax rate 
Figure 1 also shed light to our main result. Specifically, there is a range of 
parameter values for which t* is higher than t max. In this case the government chooses 
a tax rate on the negatively sloped side of the Laffer curve, and increases in t* are 
associated with falling per capita transfers. As can be verified, this occurs for 
relatively large values of α. The rationale for this is as follows: taxation redistributes 
income by changing (i) net transfers and (ii) the share of tax evading individuals. The 
probabilistic voting mechanism ensures that political parties equalize the marginal 
benefits of a higher t on (i) and (ii). For low values of α, parties increase the share of 
expected votes by redistributing between rich and poor. Whereas for high α (i.e. 
higher equality) the gains in terms of expected votes, are achieved through expanding 
the number of tax evading individuals rather than from redistributing income to the 
existing net recipients. Thus when α is high, parties propose a tax rate above the one 
that maximizes revenues. 
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The following figure presents the relationship between a and the share of evade 
income, for two levels of θ.  
 
1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
α
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
evaded income
θ=0.05
θ=0.04
 
Figure 2: Relationship between evaded income and a, for θ=0.05 and θ=0.04 
 
When θ is lower, political parties try to expand the number of expected votes by 
proposing a t that increases the number of tax evaders. This is consistent with the 
result in Figure 1, where it is clear when θ is smaller the range of values of α, over 
which t*>tmax is greater.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that in the presence of tax evasion, a government that cares 
enough for the tax evading population, may impose a greater tax rate than the one 
required to maximize revenue and that higher income inequality may be associated 
with lower redistribution. These results have important bearings both on a theoretical 
level as well as for policy recommendations. On the theoretical front, the present 
paper has shown that in the presence of tax evasion the relationship between 
inequality and government transfers may be reversed. Since the relevant empirical 
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literature on the relationship between inequality and redistribution does not take into 
account the role of institutions, our analysis may provide a potential explanation for 
the lack of clear cut empirical evidence (see e.g. Perotti,1996; Bassett et al.,1999; 
Rodriguez,1999). Moreover it provides a clear testable hypothesis for empirical 
research: inequality may positively affect redistribution only in countries with low tax 
evasion, shadow economy and corruption. For the rest of the countries the Meltzler 
and Richard (1981) effect may be the exact opposite.  
The conclusions of the present analysis can also be generalized further. Here we 
have shown that the government (or to be more specific the political parties running 
for office) uses taxation in order to increase tax evasion- which increases the welfare 
of a specific segment of the electorate- as a means to increase their expected vote 
share. In a more general setting this implies that the degree of tax evasion is not 
necessarily an exogenous constraint for the government. Rather it may be used by the 
politicians in order to get re- elected. In the present setting this leads even to a tax rate 
higher than the revenue maximizing tax rate. More generally it implies that policies 
implemented may be highly inefficient.   
 
  17
References 
Adams, J. (1999). Multiparty spatial competition with probabilistic voting. Public 
Choice 99: 259-274. 
 
Alesina, A., Baqir, R. and  Easterly, W. (2000). Redistributive public employment. 
Journal of Urban Economics 48: 219-241. 
 
Alesina, A., Danninger, S. and Rostagno, M. (2001). Redistribution through public 
employment: the case of Italy. IMF Staff Papers 48: 447- 473. 
 
Bassett, W., Burkett, J. and Putterman, L. (2003). Income distribution, government 
transfers, and the problem of unequal influence. European Journal of Political 
Economy 15:207–28. 
 
Besley, T. and Case, A. (2003). Political institutions and policy choices: evidence 
from the United States. Journal of Economic Literature 41: 7-73. 
 
Borck, R. (2007). Voting, inequality and redistribution. Journal of Economic Surveys 
21: 90-109.  
 
Borck, R. (2009). Voting on redistribution with tax evasion. Social Choice and 
Welfare 32: 439-454. 
 
Coughlin, Peter J. (1992). Probabilistic Voting Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Creedy, J. (1977). Pareto and the distribution of income. Review of Income and 
Wealth 23: 405–411. 
 
De Freitas, J. (2012). Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax mix. Public 
Choice 151: 611-630. 
 
De La Croix, D. and Doepke, M. (2009). To segregate or to integrate: education 
politics and democracy. Review of Economic Studies 76: 597-628. 
 
Heijman ,W.J.M. and van Ophem J.A.C. (2005). Willingness to pay tax: The Laffer 
curve revisited for 12 OECD countries. Journal of Socio- Economics 34: 714-
723. 
 
Hinich, M. and Munger, M.C.(1997). Analytical Politics. Cambridge:Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Laffer, A.B. (1986). The Ellipse: an explanation of the Laffer curve in a two-factor 
model. In: Canton, V.A., Kadlec, C.W., Laffer, A.B. (Eds.), The Financial 
Analyst’s Guide to Fiscal Policy. Greenwood Press, New York, pp. 1–35. 
 
Lin, T., Enelow, J.M., Dorussen, H. (1999). Equilibrium in multicandidate 
probabilistic spatial voting. Public Choice 98: 59-82 
 
  18
Matsaganis M. and Flevotomou M. (2010) Distributional implications of tax evasion 
in Greece, GreeSE Paper No31. 
 
Meltzer, A. and Richard, S. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. 
Journal of Political Economy 89: 914–927. 
 
Minford, P. and  Ashton, P. (1991). The poverty trap and the Laffer curve-What can 
the GHS tell us? Oxford Economic Papers 43: 245-79. 
 
Moene, K. O. and Wallerstein, M. (2003). Earnings inequality and welfare spending: 
a disaggregated analysis. World Politics 55: 485- 516. 
 
Mueller, D.C. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pashardes, P. and Polycarpou, A. (2008), ‘Income tax evasion, inequality and 
poverty’ Cyprus Economic Policy Review 2: 37-49. 
 
Perotti, R. (1996). Growth, income distribution, and democracy: what the data say. 
Journal of Economic Growth 1: 149-187.  
 
Roberts, K. W. S. (1977). Voting over income tax schedules. Journal of Public 
Economics 8: 329-340. 
 
Rodriguez, F. (1999). Does distributional skewness lead to redistribution? Evidence 
from the United States. Economics and Politics 11: 171-199. 
 
Rodriguez, F. (2004). Inequality, redistribution and rent- seeking. Economics and 
Politics 16: 287- 320. 
 
Roemer, J. E. (1998). Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in 
new garb. Journal of Public Economics 70: 399-424. 
 
Roine, J. (2006). The political economics of not paying taxes. Public Choice126:107-
134. 
 
Ronconi, L. (2009). Enforecement and compliance with labor regulations. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 63: article 9. 
 
Sanyal, A., Gang, I. N. and  Goswami, O. (2000). Corruption, tax evasion and the 
Laffer curve. Public Choice 105: 61-78. 
 
Schneider, F. (2005). Shadow economies around the world: what do we really 
know?   European Journal of Political Economy 21: 598-642. 
 
Skouras, S. and Christodoulakis, N. (2011). Electoral misgovernance cycles: Evidence 
from wildfires and tax evasion in Greece and elsewhere. LSE, Hellenic 
Observatory, GreeSE Paper No 47.  
 
Trabandt, M. and Uhlig, H. (2011). The Laffer curve revisited. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 58: 305-327. 
  19
 
Trabandt, M. and Uhlig, H. (2012). How Do Laffer Curves Differ Across Countries?, 
NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc. 
 
Traxler, C. (2009). Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion. Public Choice 140: 43-
58. 
 
Traxler, C. (2012). Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance. 
Journal of Public Economics 96: 1-9.
 
